This paper considers the effects of trade liberalization on child labor that arises out of subsistence needs. It argues that favorable income effects are most likely to reduce the need for child labor in the South, even when export goods have a necessity character. However, in very poor economies, aggre- Deuchert, and seminar participants at the Freiburg University for comments and helpful suggestions.
Introduction
According to recent ILO estimates, every seventh child in the world is working as a child laborer, predominantly in developing countries. 1 Triggered by the globalization debate of the last years, awareness about child labor increased hugely, both among policy makers and in the public. The link between international trade and child labor is hotly debated in particular. Does globalization increase the incidence of child labor, or conversely, does trade liberalization reduce the amount of children working?
While some of the most influential theoretical analyses Van 1998, Baland and Robinson 2000) address child labor in a closed economy setting only, 2 several studies look at the interactions between trade openness and child labor. These papers can be divided into two main categories: Earlier open economy models treat child labor either as a fully exogenous factor of production (Brown, Deardorff and Stern 1996) or as a "public bad" (Maskus and Holman 1996, Maskus 1997 ). More recent studies address endogenous child labor supply which is based on human capital investment decisions that are made under binding borrowing constraints (Grote, Basu and Weinhold 1998 , Ranjan 2001 , Jafarey and Lahiri 2002 . These studies show that international trade affects child labor decisions via two main effects: 1. income effects arise since goods and factor price changes alter real family income, 2. incentive/substitution effects arise from changes in the present and future wages of a child that change the opportunity costs and returns to education. Although the income effects in these models unambiguously reduce child labor, this reduction can be more than offset by an increase in the opportunity costs of a child's time (because of rising child wages and falling future skill premia). Thus, the effect of trade liberalization on child labor remains mainly an empirical issue.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between trade openness and child labor does not show a unified picture. In a cross-country setting, measures of trade openness and economy-wide child labor are negatively correlated. Crosssectional studies find that more open economies tend to have lower child labor force participation rates, even when other factors, like per capita income, economic structure, or educational quality, are contolled for (Shelburne 2001, Neumayer and de Soysa 2005) . Contrastingly, based on a smaller panel of developing countries, Cigno, Rosati and Guarcello (2002) do not find a robustly significant association between trade openness and child labor. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004) argue that the only channel through which the effect of trade openness is transmitted is by raising per capita GDP. 3 Studies based on microempirical data, which are generally better suited to investigate the relative strengths of income and substitution effects, show that the overall effect of trade liberalization on child labor differs across countries. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b) find that the increase in the price of rice in Vietnam caused by trade liberalization reduced significantly child labor through favorable income effects. Contrastingly, Edmonds, Pavcnik and Topalova (2005) conclude that child labor in India decreased less in provinces that were stronger exposed to tariff cuts due to their industrial employment structure. Krueger (2004) shows that during a coffee sector boom in Nicaragua, there was a significant increase in child labor among rural, coffee producing households.
The present paper puts forward an additional explanation for why child labor increases as a result of trade liberalization. While previous theoretical studies stressed mainly the trade-off between the favorable income and the unfavorable incentive effects, the present paper points out that within the poorest countries, the real income effects of trade can also raise aggregate child labor. The paper follows Basu and Van (1998) by addressing child labor that arises out of subsistence needs, 4 and adapting their main framework for a small open developing economy. Within this framework, trade liberalization can both raise or reduce the need for child labor in an individual family. The reaction of individual child labor supply depends on the distributional impacts of trade at the family level. The potential decrease in aggregate child labor is due to the poverty-reducing effect of international trade, both via an increase in average income and a reduction in inequality. 5 However, an increase in trade openness will fail to reduce child labor in aggregate terms if the economy is extremely poor and gains from trade are not large enough. This possibility arises if trade liberalization moves relatively betteroff families towards subsistence while the favorable income effect reduces child labor by less at the lower end of the income distribution. Nevertheless, the overall policy message remains positive: Income effects of trade can reduce the need for some of the worst forms of child labor, captured in this setting by longest hours of constrained work.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper supports the potential relevance of this argument. In a country panel over four decades , increases in trade openness were associated with significantly less reduction in child labor within the group of the poorest food exporters than for food exporters on average, after controlling for per capita growth, urbanization, as well as regional and time effects.
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 sets up a basic model of a small open economy with endogenously determined child labor. Section 3 derives the comparative static effects of a marginal increase in trade openness on child labor outcomes for an individual family and the economy. Section 4 offers empirical support to the main theoretical argument, while Section 5 concludes.
The model
Production and prices Consider a small open economy of Heckscher-Ohlin type that produces two goods, food X 1 and a composite manufacturing good X 2 . The manufacturing good is taken as numéraire and the relative price is given by p.
Production relies on two intersectorally mobile factors, labor L and composite (human and physical) capital K, that are fully owned by the domestic households.
All markets are perfectly competitive and hence both factors are fully employed.
The resulting zero profit and full employment conditions can be written as:
where w stands for wages per efficiency unit of labor, r for the returns to capital, and a Li (w, r), a Ki (w, r) [i = 1, 2] are the optimal per unit input coefficients of labor and capital that depend on factor prices.
The country is imperfectly integrated into the world economy; barriers to trade such as tariffs and transportation costs drive a wedge between the domestic relative price p and the world market price p w :
By assumption, good 1 (food) is produced more labor intensively. As the home country is relatively more abundant in (unskilled) labor than the rest of the trading world, food is assumed to be the export good of the economy. 6 Thus, β < 1.
As long as both goods are produced (factor endowments stay within the diversification cone), factor prices w(p) and r(p) are determined by the given output prices only.
Factor ownership and household income Assume that there are N households in the economy that are regarded as single decision making units. Household size is normalized to one parent and one child per household. household i is endowed with 1 unit of adult labor and with k i ∈ (0, k max ) units of composite capital, both inelastic in supply. Capital distribution in the economy can be described by a density function g(k). Adult income y i a is given as a sum of adult wage and capital income,
Children can also contribute to household income as they are assumed to be perfect substitutes to adult labor in production ("substitution axiom" by Basu and Van 1998) . Denote the fraction of time that a child of family i spends working by l i where 0 ≤ l i ≤ 1. Since children are less productive than adults with the efficiency parameter γ, if they are working, they earn the income y i c :
Household preferences over consumption and child labor Assume that all households have identical preferences over consumption of food c i 1 and the manufacturing good c i 2 . In order to emphasize the effects of subsistence needs, a certain amount s of food consumption is considered a necessity. As long as s is not achieved, families consume only food and none of the manufacturing good.
Utility of consumption is thus defined in two steps:
The first line of the utility function U i describes a situation where the family lives at or below the poverty line and spends all its resources on food. The second line gives the target function of the household living above the subsistence threshold, which is an increasing, strictly concave and homothetic function with two arguments, consumption of additonal food c i 1 − s and of the second good c i 2 . Child labor is assumed to exist only as long as it is needed to achieve subsistence consumption ("luxury axiom" by Basu and Van 1998) . Thus, children are compelled to work only in those families where adults cannot finance the minimum amount of food on their own. 7
Household decisions and child labor outcomes Consumption decisions arise from households maximizing utility (4) subject to the family budget constraint.
In families where adult income is higher than the costs of subsistence, y i a > ps, utility is maximized subject to the adult budget constraint y i a = pc i 1 + c i 2 . With homothetic preferences, these families spend constant fractions of adult income on both additional amounts of food c i 1 − s and the composite manufacturing good c i 2 . In families in which adult income falls short of the subsistence costs, an income gap ps − y i a arises. By the "luxury axiom", children work only to the extent needed to close this income gap:
Child income is given by the child wage (eqn. 3b), while child labor in family i is determined by the income gap and child wages:
For given goods and factor prices, child labor supply can be represented as a function of family capital k i .
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The two corner solutions pertain to relatively richer families with no child labor, and very poor families that remain below the poverty line even when their children work full-time. A third group of families lives just at the subsistence level and rely on some child labor. Denote the fraction of families living below the poverty line by η and the fraction of families that reach the subsistence level thanks to child labor by θ. Aggregate capital holdings in these two family types are given by K η = ks 0 kg(k)dk and K θ = k s ks kg(k)dk. The relevant thresholds of capital endowment k s and k s (c. f. Fig. 1 ) depend on factor and goods prices in the economy:
With capital endowment of k s , a family is just able to finance subsistence consumption when children work full time; with capital endowment of k s , adult income just covers the costs of subsistence and no child labor is necessary.
Aggregate child labor supply and goods and factor market equilibria Aggregate hours of child labor supply L C are given by the sum of individual households' child labor supplies:
L Cη gives total hours of labor by children who work full time; L Cθ aggregates interior child labor outcomes where child income Y Cθ = wγL Cθ is just covering the aggregate "income gap", pS θ − Y Aθ . 8 Since markets clear perfectly, factor employment equals aggregate factor supply measured in efficiency units, i.e. L = N +γL C . The resulting domestic income is given by Y = wL+rK = pX 1 +X 2 .
The balanced trade equilibrium of the economy is described by setting the value of export supply equal to import demand at world market prices. In equilibrium, the given world market prices and market frictions determine domestic prices. Together with the production technologies and factor endowments they determine factor rewards w, r and hence family incomes, consumption and production patterns, as well as L C , the level of child labor in the economy.
Trade liberalization and child labor
In the policy discussion, greater openness to trade is seen both as one of the causes of child labor problems world-wide and as a potential cure for them. Globalization critics often blame international trade for setting new incentives for child labor abuse in the South. In contrast, many economists believe that gains from trade can make a powerful contribution to eradicating child labor. However, while the average income effect always reduces child labor, reductions in inequality in the South can also raise child labor (c.f. Rogers and Swinnerton 2001) .
Impact of trade on goods and factor prices
Trade liberalization brings domestic relative prices p closer to the world market prices p w . In terms of the present model, β rises (hats denote percentage changes):
and hence food becomes relatively more expensive, which raises the costs of subsistence. At the same time factor prices also adjust, wages rise in terms of both goods, while capital returns fall in absolute value (Stolper and Samuelson 1941) :
For any given level of child labor, the distributional impacts of these price changes are well-known: Despite the rise in subsistence costs, the poorest benefit from a trade opening as wage increases more than compensate them for a rise in the price of food. Relatively richer families experience a relatively smaller real income gain or even a loss of real income as their capital income diminishes. As a result, income inequality in the economy is unambiguously reduced. The changes in the "income gap" trigger a child labor supply response, individual child labor decisions adapt and hence economy-wide child labor changes. 9
The reaction of individual child labor supply
The impact of trade liberalization on child labor depends on the changes in adult and child income relative to the rise in the relative price of food. In families where children work some but not all the time, the reactions of child labor supply l i c can be divided into three parts:
First, there is an adverse price effect that reduces real family income as it makes food relatively more expensive. Second, there is an adult income effect (within the brackets) that can take both signs depending on factor endowments of the family and the relative magnitudes of factor price changes. The larger the share of wage income for total adult income, the more favorable are the adult income effects. Third, there is a child income effect that unambiguously reduces child labor supply. The overall real income effect is clearly favorable for the poorest families as they experience the real gains from a wage increase but remain mainly unaffected by the falling returns to capital. Child labor supply in these families decreases. Families that have more substantial capital holdings adjust their supply of child labor upward or downward depending on the overall sign of the real income effect.
Change in economy-wide child labor supply
Changes in economy-wide child labor depend on the distribution of the income effects to individual families living at or near to the subsistence threshold. With a price change, aggregate hours of child work (7) change for two reasons: as a result of the accumulated changes in individual child labor supply among those families where child labor is interior, and due to changes in the number of children working full time and those working at all. In the present model, marginal changes of the number of child laborers have no first order effects on aggregate child labor (i.e. dL C = dL Cθ , see Appendix A). Thus, the relative change in aggregate hours of child work is determined as:
which is the economy-wide equivalent of expression (9). Under the assumption of perfect competition, factor price movements depend on the change in goods prices p . The change in child labor supply (10a) can thus be reformulated in terms of the relative price change (using the magnification effects of Jones (1965) , see Appendix A):
Child labor supply reactions depend on two main factors: 1. on the production structure, captured by the difference in unit cost shares between industries, δ(> 
Empirical evidence
The main empirical implication of the above arguments is that within exporters of subsistence goods such as food, trade liberalization can be expected to reduce the need for child labor, although not everywhere alike. The sufficient conditions for an adverse income effect of trade on child labor predicted by the model are more likely present within very poor economies. Other things being equal, the effect of trade liberalization on child labor participation rates should be less favorable in poorer countries where child labor is needed for subsistence of a large share of families. Thus, if the theoretical argument is empirically relevant, one should find that, after controlling for changes in average income, increases in trade openness reduce child labor in countries that are exporters of subsistence goods, but this effect is smaller (or even of opposite sign) for the poorest among them. 11
Data and variables
To Based on the predictions of the model, three country groups are treated dif-ferently: the poorest countries among food (subsistence good) exporters, other food exporters, and the rest. Two indicator variables are used for this purpose.
F oodExp i indicates countries that were or are large exporters of subsistence goods.
The variable takes one if the exports of food and agricultural raw materials made out more than a half of merchandising exports of a given country in at least one of the decades during the period of analysis. 16 The indicator variable I Group,i stays for the originally poorest countries within the sample. I Group,i takes the value of one if the country belongs to the group of countries that were the poorest based on their per capita GDP in 1960, where Group size varies between 15 and 35.
Estimation strategy and main results
The main estimation equation takes the following form (for country i, decade t):
Elements of the vector X it include the amount of child labor at the beginning of the first period, Chlab1960 i , the growth of GDP per capita per decade, ∆GDP it , the change in urbanization rates ∆U rban it , and regional and time controls. In order to analyze whether there is a difference in the effects of trade liberalization across country groups, the changes in openness ∆Open it have been interacted with the indicator variables F oodExp i and I Group,i : 17
The estimations have been carried out using a generalized linear model for panel data (GEE) (Liang and Zeger 1986) where the correlation structure of the error terms has been explicitly estimated. The main strength of the estimator is that it does not make the assumption of uncorrelated error terms within a group, and hence it can account for the fact that improvements in child labor conditions in a country are correlated over time. Tables 2 and 3 show the main regression results. Everything else equal, child labor force participation rates decreased by more in countries with higher child labor prevalence. On average, a 10 percentage point increase in GDP growth over a decade led to a further reduction in child labor by 0.14 percentage points. Child labor decreased also by more in countries with larger increases in urbanization.
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As compared to countries of Europe, Central Asia and North-America, decreases in child labor have been somewhat smaller in Latin America and South Asia, and considerably smaller in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Changes in openness had no additional impact on child labor on average [column (2), Table 2 ]. However, the effects of opennes differ between country groups:
the fifteen poorest exporters of subsistence goods (for which the product of the indicator variables I 15 × F oodExp equals one) experienced significantly smaller reductions in child labor [column (4), Table 2 ] than the average.
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The results of column (4) are replicated in Table 3 for differing Group sizes of the poorest countries, and the total effect for each of the three country types (average, subsistence exporters, poor subsistence exporters) is also reported. The when group size is increased (see Table 3 ) which also indicates that the effect is most relevant for the poorest countries.
Robustness of the results
The results remain broadly the same when trade liberalization is measured not by actual trade flows but by the policy-based Fraser Index ∆F raser which proxies changing trade policies (see Tables 4 and 5 ).
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The use of the Fraser Index of trade openness restricts sample size to 66 countries and makes the sample more biased towards more well-off countries. This might be one of the reasons why the explanatory power of the regressions significantly decreases when using ∆F raser instead of ∆Open. GDP growth and changes in urbanization retain their signs but lose significance. Nevertheless, there is still a significant difference between the effects of increasing trade openness for poorest and less poor food exporters; while trade liberalization reduces child labor for food exporters on average, it does not reduce it for the poorest exporters of food (see Table 5 ).
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A differential effect for the poorest countries also remains when the sample is restricted to a smaller set of countries where the mechanisms described by the model more likely apply. 18 The sample has been restricted in two ways: 1. to 68 non-high income countries (according to the definitions of the World Bank) where child labor can be supposed to pose a more relevant problem, and 2. to 46 main food exporters. In both cases, a significant differential effect of trade liberalization within the poorest countries is found when changes in trade are scaled by original levels of child labor. As to be expected, the difference is more pronounced within the sample of food exporters where the hypothesized income and price effects of trade in subsistence goods most likely apply.
One should bear in mind that these empirical results do not yield to a strictly causal interpretation. If changes in openness and changes in child labor both merely reflect underlying shifts in the general economic environment, openness
will not be exogenous to child labor. Unfortunately, there are no good instruments that would predict changes in trade policy. 19 However, there are no a priori reasons to expect the general policy environment to influence both child labor and trade policies differently within the poorest food exporters only. Thus, the patterns found here can be considered at least as indicative.
Conclusion
The paper investigated potential impacts of international trade on child labor that is motivated by subsistence needs. For this purpose, goods and factor price adjusments have been examined under the additional assumption that the Southern exportable is a necessity. It has been argued that the poorest worker families will benefit the most and the capital-rich families benefit the least or even lose from more open trade. Hence, income effects of trade can be expected to reduce child labor incidence in general. However, reduction in child labor cannot be expected to be uniform across the households. In very poor worker families children might have to work full time despite the favorable income effects while in capital-richer families child work can even increase. Among the losers from more trade there might be also families that live near to the poverty line who will be adversely af- The analysis concentrated deliberately only on income effects of trade, arguing that they determine the changes in the actual need for child labor in a family. In reality, the supply of child labor responds also to changing economic incentives, and especially to changes in expected net returns to schooling. Even so, income effects retain their importance as long as parents consider child labor as a "bad", or more importantly, as long as poverty puts effective constraints on their decisions. From a policy perspective, child labor that is compelled by poverty has a special role: As long as the child's earnings are needed for subsistence of the family, a policy intervention can only be successful if it raises the current income of the poor (be it by redistribution, credit provision or other means). Thus, the 
A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of dL C = dL Cθ : Differentiate (7) totally and get
and hence,
Relative changes in aggregate child labor (10): Equation (10a) follows from totally differentiating (7). It can be further rewritten by using the magnification effects of Jones (1965) , which can be derived by totally differentiating the zero profit conditions (1) and noting that unit input coefficients minimize unit costs: Wong 1995) . Accordingly, (10a) becomes:
The two expressions are equivalent as child income serves to close the "income gap", rK θ = pS θ − w(θN + γL Cθ ), and the zero profit conditions apply, ra K1 = p − wa L1 .
Child labor supply response if η = 0: If no families live below the poverty line, η = 0 and L Cθ = L C . Since the relatively labor intensive subsistence good is
The relationship on the LHS follows as average hours of child work among the poor families are higher as within the whole population (
Sufficient conditions for an increase in aggregate child labor: If η > 0, a sufficient condition for an increase in hours worked by children is given by
The prerequisites for such an outcome are
N : average hours of child work among the families where children work some time are lower than average hours of child work within the whole economy.
2. a L2 X 2 < a L1 (sηN −S η ): labor inputs needed to produce the amount of food that is missing for those who live below the poverty line are higher than the labor inputs used to produce the manufacturing good. This is more likely if the comparative advantage in the labor intensive good is relatively small, and if subsistence poverty is large. 2 The closed economy focus restricts the applicability of some of the policy conclusions.
B Statistical Appendix
The favorable impacts of a ban on child labor (Basu and Van 1998 , Baland and Robinson 2000 , Krueger and Tjornhom Donohue 2004 , Doepke and Zilibotti 2005 hinge on the presence of wage adjustments that result from a restriction of child labor supply. However, in a small open economy factor prices will be largely determined through international trade at the world market, and hence the room for factor price movements is severely limited. Under these conditions, a direct ban on child labor can turn out harmful for the poor and is bound to encounter enforcement problems (Dixit 2000) . reversals occur. This assumption will be made throughout the model. 7 This presumes that for any adult income above the costs of subsistence the marginal disutility of child labor always exceeds the marginal utility of consumption. 8 The aggregate "income gap" is the difference between aggregate food consumption S θ = sθN and aggregate adult income Y Aθ = wθN + rK θ in those families in which child labor is interior. 9 There will be also a further production effect that arises due to a change in child labor supply, and that alters the economy's production possibilities set. This leads to a reallocation of resources between the sectors via the Rybczynski effect (1955) . Since under the assumption of imperfect specialization it has no further impacts on family income, this last production effect will be ignored in the present analysis. 10 As adult incomes differ only because of capital endowment differences in the model, the distributional impacts of changing factor prices can be interpreted in terms of household poverty. Would one distinguish between worker and capitalist households instead, child labor would increase in poor capitalist households, decrease in poor worker households, while it would not react within the extremely poor worker households. Increases in aggregate child labor would be most likely if a large part of poor capitalist households sent their children to work and increases in child labor among them were not compensated by reductions in child labor among poor worker households. I owe this point to an anonymous referee. 11 In the model the concept of poverty necessary for adverse child labor response is multidimensional. It requires low productivity, large subsistence poverty with children working full-time, and relatively high poverty among small owners of capital. Although the "group of poorest countries" used in the empirical analysis does not cover all of the above aspects, it can be still expected that such adverse circumstances are more likely present in extremely poor economies. 12 Countries that did not exist in their present form in 1960 are thus excluded from the analysis as well as countries where information on trade openness has been entirely missing.
ily on projections (both intra-and extrapolations) for its estimates of economic activity rates (ILO 2000) . Thus, the reductions in child labor force participation rates will appear considerably smoother in the data than in the reality. In the paper changes in child labor over ten-year periods are used that are relatively less effected by the issue. 15 The correlation coefficient between ∆Open and ∆F raser amounts to 0.33. The other commonly used measure of trade openness, the Sachs and Warner (1995) opennes indicators, could not be used because within the group of the poorest countries there were too few large switches of trade regime which makes a decomposition of the effects of openness change between poor and less poor impossible. 16 The categories food and agricultural raw products comprise the commodities of SITC sections 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), 2 (crude materials except fuels), and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats). From section 2 divisions 27 and 28 (crude fertilizers, minerals, metalliferous ores and scrap) are excluded. 17 Additionally to that, in a series of regressions (not reported here but available on request) the changes in openness have been interacted with the amount of child labor in 1960, Chlab1960 i . This generally increased significance of the results and the fit of the regressions which indicates that the impacts of openness were stronger in countries with originally higher levels of child labor. 18 The results of these regressions are available from the author on request.
19 Geographic instruments and the concept of geography based trade openness (see Frankel and Rose 2002) are of no help in this case as they capture openness to trade in an inherently static manner and hence do not help to predict policy changes. Notes: The models are estimated using the GEE approach where the correlation structure of the error terms is explicitly estimated. Additional controls include time-dummies that are not reported. The reported absolute values of the t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on semi-robust standard errors. Results of Wald-tests of the models are reported, with the degrees of freedom of the χ 2 statistics in parentheses. Notes: The models are estimated using the GEE approach where the correlation structure of the error terms is allowed to vary over time. The reported absolute values of the tstatistics (in parentheses) are based on semi-robust standard errors. Additional controls include a constant, Chlab1960, ∆GDP , ∆U rban, time dummies, and five region dummies (for East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa). Notes: The models are estimated using the GEE approach where the correlation structure of the error terms is explicitly estimated. Additional controls include time-dummies that are not reported. The reported absolute values of the t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on semi-robust standard errors. Results of Wald-tests of the models are reported, with the degrees of freedom of the χ 2 statistics in parentheses. Notes: The models are estimated using the GEE approach where the correlation structure of the error terms is allowed to vary over time. The reported absolute values of the tstatistics (in parentheses) are based on semi-robust standard errors. Additional controls include a constant, Chlab1970, ∆GDP , ∆U rban, time dummies, and five region dummies (for East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
